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Abstract
Giving with a warm hand: evidence on estate planning and bequests
In this paper we study the bequest motive for saving, using administrative data on 
all deaths that occurred in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2013. In doing so, 
we build on the previous work by Kopczuk (2007). We study whether individuals 
start transferring part of their estate to their heirs in the expectation of death in the 
foreseeable future. First, we distinguish between sudden and non-sudden death. 
Second, controlling for gender, age, marital status, and permanent income, we find 
that non-sudden deaths are associated with less wealth at the time of death. We find 
the strongest effect, a difference in financial wealth of about 24%, for single individ-
uals who die of cancer. Relying on the richness of our data and on the characteristics 
of the Dutch institutional context, we interpret this result as a reflection estate plan-
ning that is triggered by an underlying bequest motive.
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Samenvatting
Geven met een warme hand: bewijs van erfenisplanning
In dit paper bestuderen wij het erfenismotief voor sparen, gebruikmakend van 
administratieve data betreffende alle sterfgevallen die zich in Nederland hebben 
voorgedaan tussen 2006 en 2013. Hiermee bouwen wij voort op het eerdere werk van 
Kopczuk (2007). Wij onderzoeken of mensen een deel van hun nalatenschap overdra-
gen aan hun erfgenamen in de verwachting van een nabije dood. Allereerst maken 
we onderscheid tussen verwachte en onverwachte sterfgevallen. Ten tweede, con-
trolerend voor geslacht, leeftijd, burgerlijke staat en permanent inkomen, stellen we 
vast dat verwachte sterfgevallen geassocieerd worden met minder vermogen op het 
moment van overlijden. We constateren het sterkste effect, een verschil in financieel 
vermogen van ongeveer 24%, voor alleenstaanden die aan kanker overlijden. Op basis 
van de hoeveelheid gegevens en de kenmerken van de Nederlandse institutionele 
context interpreteren wij dit resultaat als een afspiegeling van het plannen van de 
nalatenschap waarbij een onderliggend erfenismotief de aanleiding vormt.
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1. Introduction
It is widely recognized in the literature on retirement savings that retirees, espe-
cially those with a high lifetime income, do not consume their wealth as much as 
the stripped version of the life-cycle model predicts.1 The economic literature has 
proposed three main explanations for this stylized fact: precautionary saving due to 
longevity risk (e.g. De Nardi et al., 2009; and Post and Hanewald, 2013), precautionary 
saving due to uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenditures (e.g. Coile and Milligan, 
2009; and De Nardi et al., 2010), and the bequest motive for saving (e.g. Kopczuk, 
2007; and De Nardi and Yang, 2014). Even though the evidence on the relative impor-
tance of these three motives is rather mixed, all three are generally considered to be 
meaningful additions to the life-cycle model.
 Research as to whether wealth accumulation through the life cycle responds to 
a precautionary motive, a bequest motive, or a pure life-cycle motive contributes 
towards a better understanding of the spending priorities and consumption needs 
of retired individuals. Therefore, it is highly relevant for a range of issues related to 
pension policies and long-term care provision. For instance, it is relevant for a better 
understanding of topics such as pension adequacy and the displacement effect of 
pension wealth on household savings.2 Furthermore, focusing on the bequest motive 
is particularly relevant since it provides insight into the intergenerational effect of 
pension policies. In addition, an understanding of the presence and intensity of the 
bequest motive is helpful for assessing the demand for insurance against longevity 
risk and long-term care risk (Lockwood, 2012, 2018).
 In this study we contribute to the literature by empirically studying the bequest 
motive using Dutch administrative micro data. Previous literature on the bequest 
motive for saving has mostly focused on estimating bequest parameters in struc-
tural models by matching model predictions to observed saving and consumption 
behavior (e.g. Hurd, 1989; De Nardi, 2004; and Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007). To obtain 
sharper identification of the bequest preference parameter, more recent literature 
has addressed saving behavior in combination with choices regarding long-term 
care insurance (e.g. Ameriks et al., 2011; De Nardi et al., 2016a; and Lockwood, 2018). 
However, the main hurdle faced by this literature is that the precautionary motive 
1 For thorough literature surveys and evidence on this stylized fact, see van Ooijen et al. (2015), 
De Nardi et al. (2016b), and Suari-Andreu et al. (2019).
2 See Knoef et al. (2016) for a review of the literature on pension adequacy, and see Lachowska 
and Myck (2018) for a review of the literature on the displacement effect.
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and the bequest motive generate similar wealth trajectories, making it problematic to 
distinguish between the two.
 By extending the previous work by Kopczuk (2007), we propose an alternative 
strategy which circumvents the above-mentioned identification problem. To that 
end, we employ an administrative dataset containing all deaths that took place in 
the Netherlands between 2006 and 2013. This dataset contains just over one million 
deaths and allows coupling of information on each decedent with information on the 
decedent’s children. The starting point of our strategy consists of identifying sudden 
deaths, for which we use the operationalization proposed by Andersen and Nielsen 
(2010, 2016). The size of the dataset that we employ allows for accurate identification 
of a large number of cases of sudden death. Once these are singled out, we regress 
household wealth at the end of life on a dummy variable indicating sudden death 
while controlling for age at death, gender, marital status, household structure, 
permanent income, and children characteristics. We hypothesize that individuals who 
do not suffer a sudden death will have less wealth at the time of death, reflecting 
inter-vivos transfers that result from estate planning during the final phase of life. 
Following Kopczuk (2007), we interpret transfers to heirs resulting from deathbed 
estate planning as reflecting an underlying bequest motive for saving.
 Our strategy faces two main challenges. First, it may be that individuals who do 
not suffer a sudden death die with less wealth because of higher medical and/or 
non-medical expenditures at the end of life. As to medical expenditures, the Dutch 
institutional context prevents these from having any major role due to widespread 
insurance coverage (Bakx et al., 2016).3 As to non-medical expenditures, van Ooijen 
et al. (2018) show, using Dutch survey data, that poor health has a negative effect 
on non-medical expenditures. Therefore, if individuals who do not suffer a sudden 
death experience worse health at the end of life, any negative relation between 
non-sudden death and wealth at the end of life will reflect a lower bound. Second, it 
may be that any difference in wealth at the time of death is explained by differential 
incidence of health-related income shocks for sudden and non-sudden deaths.4 
Using the same Dutch administrative data that we employ, Garcia-Gomez et al. (2013) 
find that unexpected hospitalizations result on average in a 5% reduction in yearly 
3 Bakx et al. (2016) describe the Dutch healthcare system in depth and show that out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures constitute only about 5% of yearly healthcare expenditures, the lowest 
percentage among OECD countries (OECD, 2017).
4 This argument is true as long as health shocks translate into substantial income shocks. How-
ever, the Dutch disability insurance system ensures that health shocks do not translate into 
large income drops. For details on the Dutch disability insurance system, see Garcia-Gomez et 
al. (2013).
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income. Even though this effect is small effect, it could indeed impact our results. 
Therefore, we rerun our analyses leaving out individuals who were hospitalized before 
retirement.
 The baseline results show that, after controlling for the above-mentioned vari-
ables, individuals who suffer a non-sudden death die with significantly less wealth 
compared to individuals who suffer a sudden death. The effects are significant at the 
0.1% level for singles and at the 0.5% level for couples, and range from -4.54% for 
the net worth of couples to -11.63% for the net financial wealth of singles.5 When 
we exclude individuals with hospital admissions before retirement, and thus limit 
the possibility of income shocks that would explain our results, the effect for singles 
is reduced but nearly unaltered, while the effect for couples becomes insignificant. 
These results are in line with health-related income shocks playing a small but 
non-negligible role in explaining wealth differences at the end of life. They are also 
in line with the presence of a bequest motive towards the partner for individuals who 
die within a couple; this we do not directly capture since we observe wealth at the 
household level.
 Following Kopczuk (2007), we interpret these results as reflecting estate planning 
that is triggered by an underlying bequest motive. The large size of our dataset 
allows us to study the heterogeneity of the main effect across several dimensions. 
These analyses yield no significant differences across gender, a slightly larger effect 
for individuals who die at an older age (above 70), and an especially large effect 
for single individuals who die of cancer. In addition, observing the entire wealth 
distribution allows us to test for differential effects across wealth levels using quantile 
regression. We find that in absolute terms the effect increases as we move up the 
distribution, while the relative effect decreases. Finally, we use the data on the chil-
dren of decedents to test whether the effect is different between individuals with and 
without children. In this case the results show no significant differences for the two 
groups. This is in line with most relevant contributions in the literature on bequests. 
These find very weak evidence of a bequest motive when estimating it based on the 
assumption that individuals without children do not have a bequest motive (Hurd, 
1989; Lockwood, 2018).
 Even though we can confidently say that we succeeded in capturing estate 
planning type of behavior, it is less clear whether the wealth being transferred was 
initially accumulated for the purpose of being left as a bequest. It might be that 
5 Given the large number of observations we employ in the analysis, we lower the conventional 
thresholds for statistical significance by dividing them by ten.
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individuals save initially mostly for precautionary reasons, with the bequest motive 
as a secondary priority, and that, when they become ill towards the end of life, 
the bequest becomes then the main priority. However, our results indicate that the 
bequest parameter as usually modelled in the life-cycle model is positive, which 
according to the model itself should impact lifetime consumption and saving deci-
sions. Even if this is not entirely the case, our results, in combination with those of 
van Ooijen et al. (2018),6 do clearly reflect a preference for bequests vis-à-vis other 
uses of wealth by individuals who do not suffer a sudden death. If this preference is 
triggered by a health shock and/or by a shortened expected remaining lifetime, our 
results are still relevant for the above-mentioned policy aspects insofar as they reflect 
spending preferences of older individuals.
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the strategy by 
Kopczuk (2007) to identify the bequest motive and how our study complements and 
expands this strategy. Section 3 provides the regression equation that we estimate. 
Section 4 describes the data and provides summary statistics for the most relevant 
variables. Section 5 provides the results, and Section 6 concludes and summarizes 
policy implications and venues for future research. The appendices provide definitions 
and summary statistics for all variables that we use, additional summary statistics for 
the cause of death and sudden death variables and full regression results.
6 van Ooijen et al. (2018) find that, among older individuals, health deterioration leads to lower 
general non-medical consumption and higher expenditure on gifts.
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2. Identifying the bequest motive
2.1 Kopczuk’s strategy
As mentioned in the introduction, most of the existing literature on the bequest 
motive for saving focuses on estimating parameters in structural models in order 
to match observed saving, consumption, and long-term care insurance decisions. 
Departing from this main stream of literature, Kopczuk (2007) pioneered a strategy 
consisting of identifying the bequest motive by studying whether individuals start 
transferring part of their estate in the expectation of imminent death. To do so, 
Kopczuk (2007) employed American estate data on a sample of deaths that occurred 
between 1976 and 1977. He identified sudden deaths as those not caused by a previ-
ously diagnosed illness, and classified deaths that are not sudden as either preceded 
by a short (hours, days or weeks) or long illness (months or years). Controlling for 
gender, marital status, age, and permanent income, he regressed wealth at time of 
death on length of illness. He argued that, if deaths preceded by a terminal illness 
are associated with lower wealth at the moment of death, this is due to individuals 
transferring part of their estate in the expectation of a near death.
 The assumption underpinning Kopczuk’s strategy is that transfers to heirs resulting 
from deathbed estate planning reflect the presence of a bequest motive for saving. 
Given a bequest motive, there are two reasons for individuals to engage in early 
bequest giving in the expectation of an imminent death. First, as pointed out by 
Kopczuk (2010) and McGarry (2013), the reason may be inheritance tax avoidance. 
Second, as proposed by McGarry (2000, 2013), the purpose may be to exert control 
over recipiency and use of the assets transferred. Contrary to these two reasons, these 
transfers may involve the cost of implying relinquishment of control over assets that 
individuals might need if they live longer than expected or encounter unexpected 
expenditures (McGarry, 2000).
 Kopczuk (2007) observed only individuals whose wealth exceeds the minimum 
estate tax threshold. Effectively this means that he only observed the top of the 
wealth distribution and thus had to rely on truncated regression techniques. In addi-
tion, due to missing data on income, most of his analysis focused on married males, 
for whom he found that short illnesses lead to a 5% to 10% decline in wealth at time 
of death, while long illnesses lead to a decline of 15% to 20%. Even though this seems 
a very plausible result, it can be challenged from several angles. First, it could be 
explained by wealth shocks resulting from medical expenses or lost income. Second, 
it could be that individuals who become ill update their rate of time preference and 
increase their non-medical consumption. To tackle the first point, Kopczuk (2007) 
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controlled for previous labor income (about five years before death), and performed 
an additional analysis using survey data to show that the magnitude of medical 
expenditures is not sufficient to explain the result of the main analysis. Even though 
the outcome of these analyses backs his interpretation of the main results, the second 
point mentioned above is not addressed.
2.2 Extension of Kopczuk’s strategy
In this study we perform an analysis using a dataset and a context that help address-
ing the shortcomings mentioned in Section 2.1. For every death that took place in the 
Netherlands between 2006 and 2013, we observe gender, age, cause of death, previ-
ous income (back to 2003), previous wealth (back to 2005), previous hospital admis-
sions (dating back to 1995), household structure, and presence of children, as well as 
the characteristics of the latter. The richness and the size of this dataset allow us to 
test for the heterogeneity of the effect we estimate across several dimensions, namely 
gender, age, cause of death, and the presence of children. In addition, observing the 
entire wealth distribution implies that we do not need to rely on truncated regression, 
and it allows us to check, by applying quantile regression, whether the effect we want 
to estimate differs across the wealth distribution.
 An important advantage of having access to data on cause of death and on 
hospital visits is that it allows us to accurately identify sudden deaths following the 
operationalization of Andersen and Nielsen (2010, 2016). According to the latter, sud-
den deaths are medically defined as unexpected deaths that occur instantaneously 
or within a few hours of an abrupt change in the person’s clinical state. Therefore, 
as argued by Andersen and Nielsen (2010, 2016), a sudden death is close to a random 
draw, which, if properly identified, allows for a more refined application of Kopczuk’s 
strategy. However, it may still be that differential consumption patterns and income 
shocks for sudden and non-sudden deaths explain an effect that would otherwise be 
attributed to estate planning.
 As to the potential role of consumption, the Dutch context prevents any major 
influence of medical and non-medical expenditures on the results. As to medical 
expenditures, in the Netherlands there is universal coverage of both curative and 
long-term care. Bakx et al. (2016), who describe the Dutch healthcare system in 
depth, show that between 1998 and 2014 out-of-pocket medical expenditures 
constituted only about 5% of yearly healthcare expenditures, the lowest percentage 
among OECD countries (OECD, 2017). As to non-medical expenditures, van Ooijen et 
al. (2018), using a representative Dutch survey and exploiting individual variation 
over time, show that poor health has a negative effect on expenditures. They find 
netspar design paper 120 12
that poor general health leads to a 3% reduction in expenditures and that functional 
disabilities and severe chronic illnesses decrease consumption by 4.9% and 7.3%, 
respectively. They do not find an effect for mental health.7
 In addition to preventing any major role of medical and non-medical expendi-
tures, the Dutch context also prevents any sizeable effect of income shocks. The Dutch 
disability insurance system ensures that individuals receive full income for the two 
years following a health shock that causes disability, and a minimum replacement 
rate of 70% from the third year onwards. Garcia-Gomez et al. (2013) explain the 
disability benefit system in full detail and empirically study the effect on employment 
and income of health shocks. Using the same administrative data that we use in this 
study, they find that an unscheduled hospital admission lowers the probability of 
remaining in employment by seven percentage points, and results in a loss of about 
5% in annual personal income. Even though these effects are not excessively large, 
we prevent them from affecting our results by rerunning our analyses using only 
observations without hospital admission before retirement.
7 In addition to their main results, van Ooijen et al. (2018) also find that the decrease in 
non-medical expenditures does not coincide with an increase in medical expenditures. Their 
results agree with a large strand of literature which argues that poor health has a negative 
effect on the marginal utility of non-medical consumption. For a survey of this literature, see 
Finkelstein et al. (2009, 2013).
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3. Econometric model
The insights by Garcia-Gomez et al. (2013), Bakx et al. (2016), and van Ooijen et al. 
(2018) make clear that the Netherlands provides a very appropriate context to apply 
our strategy to identify the bequest motive for saving. We regress wealth at the 
end of life on a dummy indicating sudden death using a cross-section of deaths 
that occurred between 2006 and 2013. The regression equation we estimate is the 
following
 Wi = β0 + NSiβ1 + Xʹ1iβ2 + Xʹ2iβ3 + tʹiβ4 + εi, (1)
where Wi stands for either household net worth or net financial wealth at the end 
of life for individual i ; NSi is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in case of 
a non-sudden death; X1i is a vector of controls including age dummies, household 
structure, and permanent income; X2i is a vector containing children variables (i.e. 
number of children, average age, and average permanent income of the children); 
ti contains a set of dummies controlling for the year of death; and εi is the individu-
al-specific error term. Since we control for both age and year of death, we indirectly 
control as well for cohort effects. Operationalization of wealth, sudden deaths, and 
permanent income is discussed in Section 5, while Appendix A provides definitions 
and summary statistics for all variables employed in the analysis.
 We estimate Equation (1) separately for singles and couples to account for the fact 
that the incentives and motivations behind the life cycle decisions of these two types 
of household are intrinsically different from each other.8 In addition, we assume that 
the error term εi is independent across observations. However, given the skewness 
of the wealth distribution, it is likely that εi is not homoskedastic. Therefore, we use 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in all our estimations. However, since we 
observe the whole universe of deaths that occurred between 2006 and 2013 in the 
Netherlands, and thus there is no sampling error, it is not straightforward what the 
interpretation of the standard errors should be. In that regard, we follow Abadie et al. 
(2014) and think of our study in a potential outcome framework. In such a framework, 
we observe one of all possible states of the world. The standard errors tell us thus 
how representative is the state of the world that we observe of all potential states.
8 In that way we also avoid using in the same regression two observations belonging to the same 
household. That is because if both individuals within a couple die between 2006 and 2013, the 
first death will be included in the couples regression while the second will be included in the 
singles regression.
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4. Data and summary statistics
4.1 Data sources
For our study, we use Dutch data from different administrative sources, which we 
merge into one single dataset. All data were provided to us by Statistics Netherlands. 
They encompass the universe of deaths that occurred in the Netherlands between 
2006 and 2013, i.e. 1,079,126 deaths. By means of an encrypted social security number, 
we merge data on cause of death from the death register with data on demographic 
characteristics from municipal records, on household income and wealth from the 
tax administration, and on hospital admissions from the hospital discharge register. 
In addition, we are able to match each decedent in the data set with the decedent’s 
children.
 After the merging process, we are left with a dataset of individual deaths that 
contains the following information on each decedent: date of death, cause of death, 
age, gender, marital status, household structure,9 household net worth at the end 
of the year prior to death, yearly household disposable income from 2003 until the 
year prior to death, hospital admissions from 1995 until the time of death, and 
presence and characteristics of children. The data on hospital admissions contain 
date and diagnosis for each admission. Causes of death and hospital diagnoses are 
classified according to the 10th revision of the International Statistical Classification 
of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10), as assembled by the World Health 
Organization.10
 Net worth equals total assets minus total liabilities.11 Assets can be divided into 
financial and non-financial assets. The former can be disaggregated into deposits, 
saving accounts, stocks, and bonds, while the latter can be disaggregated into 
housing (primary residence) and other non-financial assets (housing wealth other 
than the primary residence plus business wealth).12 Liabilities can be disaggregated 
into mortgage debt and non-mortgage debt. Due to missing data on wealth and 
income, the number of observations after the merging process drops from 1,079,126 
to 1,073,282.
9 Household structure includes several categories indicating the presence of children and/or 
other relatives and non-relatives in the household. It also includes a separate category for 
institutionalized households, i.e. households whose members live in a nursing home.
10 For further information on the ICD-10, see WHO (2016).
11 For additional description and applications of the wealth data that we employ, see de Bresser 
and Knoef (2015) and Knoef et al. (2016).
12 Stocks and bonds also include indirect ownership through mutual funds.
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4.2 Wealth at the end of life
The data on assets and liabilities are given at the household level and are measured 
as of December 31 of the year prior to death. Therefore, we use wealth on December 
31 of the year prior to death as a measure of wealth at the end of life. This implies 
that there is a delay between the date of wealth measurement and the actual date 
of death. Since we observe the exact date of death, we compute this delay (in days) 
and include it as a control variable in our regressions. We distinguish between total 
net worth (NW) and net financial wealth (NFW) since liquid wealth is arguably the 
most likely to be passed on as an early bequest. We calculate net financial wealth by 
deducting non-mortgage debt from the sum of all financial assets (deposits, saving 
accounts, stocks, and bonds).
 Table 1 shows how both NW and NFW at the end of life are distributed by gender 
and marital status of the decedent. The first thing to note is that, as the literature 
on retirement savings summarized by De Nardi et al. (2016b) points out, individuals 
retain considerable amounts of wealth at the very end of their life, be it accidental or 
intentional. Males generally die with more wealth than females, and NW is consid-
erably higher than NFW. A second aspect to note is that, as expected, wealth shows a 
high degree of positive skewness. Grouping all demographic categories together, Table 
1 shows that for NW the average is 5.75 higher than the median, while for NFW it is 
3.85 higher. The 99th percentile column shows very high values for all demographic 
groups, especially for married males. The possibility of capturing this percentile accu-
rately is a strong advantage of the administrative data that we use, since the top 1% is 
usually underrepresented in survey data.
Table 1 Wealth at the end of life (thousands of e)
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 Obs.
Net worth
Single females 132 1 5 21 127 366 569 1,336 409,816
Single males 152 0 3 23 167 410 629 1,463 213,223
Married females 236 1 14 91 288 534 786 1,921 146,115
Married males 253 2 16 104 309 573 841 2,037 304,128
All 184 1 7 32 223 466 698 1,638 1,073,282
Net financial wealth
Single females 62 0 4 16 42 140 255 749 409,816
Single males 67 0 2 15 46 147 270 791 213,223
Married females 90 1 6 24 68 179 314 1,049 146,115
Married males 97 1 8 25 72 186 330 1,143 304,128
All 77 0 4 20 54 162 287 896 1,073,282
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4.3 Sudden deaths
Kopczuk (2007) defines sudden deaths as deaths that are not caused by a previous 
illness, and he classifies deaths that are not sudden as either preceded by a short 
(hours, days or weeks) or long (months or years) illnesses. We refine this strategy by 
using the operationalization of sudden deaths provided by Andersen and Nielsen 
(2010, 2016). They use the ICD-10 and distinguish between natural and unnatural 
deaths. As to the former, they consider acute myocardial infarction (ICD-10: I21-I22), 
cardiac arrest (I46), congestive heart failure (I50), stroke (I60-I68), and sudden deaths 
from unknown causes (R95-R96) as sudden deaths. As to unnatural deaths, they 
consider transport accidents (V00-V99), and deaths caused by other accidents and 
violence (W00-W99, X00-X59, X85-X99, and Y00-Y84) as sudden.13 Given the size and 
the richness of our dataset we can go further than Andersen and Nielsen (2010, 2016) 
in refining the definition of sudden death. We do so by excluding from the sudden 
death category those deaths that are caused by a cardiovascular event and that are 
preceded by at least one hospital admission related to a cardiovascular disease. With 
this definition we get 141,308 sudden deaths, which is 13.17% of all deaths.14
 Andersen and Nielsen (2010, 2016) consider sudden deaths to be a random draw 
and thus, in principle, unrelated to specific individual characteristics. Table 2 shows 
the average and the median of each variable used in our analysis for sudden and 
non-sudden deaths.15 Most values are similar for the two groups, but there are some 
small differences. Individuals who suffer a sudden death die at a slightly older age 
and include slightly more males than females. In addition, they are less likely to be 
married and have slightly lower wealth and income. Table 3 shows the share of sud-
den deaths by gender, marital status, and age category. The most noticeable features 
are that younger males are the most likely to suffer a sudden death as a share of 
age-specific total deaths, and that the relation between the share of sudden deaths 
and age is U-shaped: the former decreases up to the 60-70 age category and then 
increases again for older age categories.
 It is these differences across age groups that seem to drive the higher share of 
sudden deaths among single individuals. This evidence shows that sudden deaths are 
13 The latter category excludes deaths by suicide.
14 Table B1 in Appendix B shows all deaths classified using the ICD-10 general categories for dis-
eases and conditions. Table B2 shows only sudden deaths and classifies them using more spe-
cific categories.
15 Following Abadie et al. (2014), we do not provide standard errors in Table 2. The latter derive 
a formula for the standard error of a sample mean that converges to zero as the sample 
approaches the population.
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Table 2 Summary statistics by (non-)sudden death
Sudden deaths Non-sudden deaths
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
Permanent income 18,932 16,491 19,337 16,910
Net worth 181,381 29,228 184,845 32,863
Net financial wealth 79,041 19,900 76,661 19,584
Female 0.51 - 0.56 -
Age 77.42 82 76.46 79
Retired 0.75 - 0.77 -
Number of children 2.20 2 2.27 2
Marital status
– Married 0.34 - 0.43 -
– Divorced 0.08 - 0.08 -
– Widowed 0.23 - 0.21 -
– Never married 0.35 - 0.27 -
Household structure
– One person household 0.36 - 0.31 -
– Single parent 0.03 - 0.03 -
– Couple without children 0.27 - 0.36 -
– Couple with children 0.06 - 0.06 -
– Multiperson household 0.05 - 0.04 -
– Institutionalized household 0.23 - 0.20 -
Notes: Multiperson household refers to households with any of the other possible structures 
(except institutionalized household ) plus at least one additional member who is not a child or 
a spouse. A household is considered institutionalized if at least one member lives in a nursing 
home or other institution. The dataset is composed of 141,308 sudden deaths (13.17%) and 
931,974 non-sudden deaths (86.83%).
Table 3 Share of sudden deaths by age, gender, and marital status 
Single Married
Females Males Females Males
Age Category Share Obs. Share Obs. Share Obs. Share Obs.
<50 14.21% 2.49% 24.88% 8.06% 11.43% 6.69% 21.59% 3.16%
50-60 10.53% 3.29% 16.35% 9.82% 8.09% 13.88% 14.31% 8.14%
60-70 9.99% 6.39% 13.02% 14.78% 7.84% 23.18% 9.78% 20.05%
70-80 12.38% 16.39% 11.13% 22.60% 11.01% 29.32% 8.72% 33.49%
80-90 15.84% 44.54% 12.44% 32.43% 14.57% 24.20% 10.22% 30.69%
>90 18.59% 27.15% 16.26% 12.31% 17.91% 2.74% 14.59% 4.47%
All 15.45% 100% 14.09% 100% 10.95% 100% 10.51% 100%
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not purely random and that we have to control at least for age, gender, and marital 
status.
4.4 Permanent income
Besides the demographic variables pointed out in Section 4.3, it is important to con-
trol for permanent income. That is because it might correlate with both wealth and 
health status at the end of life.16 To measure permanent income, Kopczuk (2007) used 
as a proxy personal labor income observed for a single period, which may be from five 
to ten years before death. In our study, we observe yearly total income at the house-
hold level for the period between 2003 and the year prior to death. Additionally, for 
every year we know the main source of income of the household.
 With this information, we generate a proxy for permanent income by applying the 
following rule: if the main source of income in the year prior to death is not pension 
income, we take the average of equivalized household income between 2003 and the 
year prior to death; if the main source of income in the year prior to death is pension 
income, then we just take equivalized household income corresponding to that 
particular year.17 This strategy is based on Knoef et al. (2013), who, using data for the 
Netherlands, argue that pension income is a particularly good proxy for permanent 
income.18 To account for the two different methodologies employed to measure 
permanent income, we generate a dummy variable, indicating which methodology is 
used for each decedent, and include it in our regressions.19
16 The key assumption here is that controlling for permanent income, together with age, accounts 
for the correlation between health status, mortality, and wealth that is frequently encountered 
in the literature (Attanasio and Emmerson, 2003).
17 We equivalize household income by dividing yearly income by the square root of the number of 
members in the household in that year. We apply this transformation because in many cases 
household structure experiences changes during the years prior to death.
18 Knoef et al. (2013) show that the variance of income shocks is smaller for retirees than for 
working individuals, and that income shocks are more persistent for retirees. For these reasons 
they argue that pension income is a specially good proxy for permanent income.
19 Pension income is used in 77.06% of the cases.
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5. Results
We start out this section by estimating Equation (1) without controlling for the chil-
dren variables (i.e. setting β3 = 0), using both net worth and net financial wealth as 
dependent variables and pay attention to the estimate of the effect of a non-sudden 
death (i.e. β1), which we expect to be negative. In a second step, we test whether the 
results hold when we leave out individuals with hospital admissions before retire-
ment. In a third step, we test whether the effect is dependent on gender, age, and 
cause of death. In a fourth step, we employ quantile regression to test whether the 
effect differs along the wealth distribution. In a fifth and final step, we introduce the 
vector of children variables X2i in the regression equation, which includes number of 
children, average age of the children, and average permanent income of the children, 
and test whether the effect differs between individuals with and without children. 
Throughout this section we provide estimates of β1 only. Appendix C provides the full 
results of our baseline estimation.
Table 4 Results: baseline 
Net worth Net financial wealth
(a)
Singles -7,643.79*** -5.49% -4,446.95*** -6.94%
(1,642.00) (1.18%) (1,278.34) (2.00%)
Couples -11,374.39** -4.60% -7,797.85* -8.22%
(3,635.17) (1.47%) (3,175.98) (3.35%)
(b)
Singles -10,106.52*** -7.26% -7,284.17*** -11.63%
(1,819.19) (1.31%) (1,441.29) (2.30%)
Couples -11,413.14** -4.54% -10,010.55** -10.57%
(3,848.61) (1.53%) (3,315.01) (3.50%)
Notes: Each cell provides an estimate of β1 in Equation (1). Percentage effects are presented next to 
each coefficient estimate. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are provided in parenthesis. 
Panel (a) provides the effect of NSi on Wi, while Panel (b) provides the same effect conditional on 
non-sudden deaths having at least one hospital admission related to cause of death. In Panel (a), 
singles regressions include 588,818 observations, while couples regressions include 433,202 
observations. In Panel (b), singles regressions include 296,744 observations, while couples 
regressions include 245,849 observations. Given the large number of observations we employ in 
the analysis, we lower the conventional thresholds for statistical significance by dividing them by 
ten. *Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 0.5% level, ***significant at the 0.1% level.
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5.1 Baseline
Panel (a) in Table 4 provides the baseline estimates of β1 in Equation (1), separately 
for singles and for couples. As explained in Section 3, we estimate separate models for 
singles and couples to account for the fact that incentives and motivations behind the 
life-cycle decisions of these two types of households are intrinsically different from 
each other. Panel (b) provides the same estimates, conditional on non-sudden deaths 
being preceded by at least one hospital admission related to cause of death. All esti-
mates of β1 in Table 4 are negative as expected, with stronger effects being estimated 
in Panel (b) compared to Panel (a). Focusing on the relative effects, these are larger for 
singles than for couples and for net financial wealth vis-à-vis net worth. In addition, 
the estimates for couples are less statistically significant.20 These differences are in 
line with the estimates reflecting transfers that result from estate planning. That is 
because, on the one hand, these transfers are likely to be made in liquid forms of 
wealth, while, on the other hand, individuals who die within a couple are likely to 
also have a bequest motive towards their partner, which we do not capture because 
we observe wealth at the household level.
Following the above-mentioned reasoning, it makes sense that the smallest effect in 
Table 4 (i.e. -4.54%) is estimated for the net worth of couples, while the largest effect 
(i.e. -11.63%) is estimated for the net financial wealth of singles. In addition it makes 
sense that Panel (b) shows larger effects than Panel (a). That is because non-sudden 
deaths that are preceded by a cause-of-death-related hospital admission are more 
likely to be expected. The results we present here are in line with those by Kopczuk 
(2007), and we interpret them as reflecting estate planning triggered by an underlying 
bequest motive.
5.2 Income shocks
As mentioned in Section 2, the results in Table 4 could be explained by either differ-
ential patterns in consumption or the differential incidence of income shocks for indi-
viduals who suffer a sudden death vis-`a-vis individuals who do not suffer a sudden 
death. As to differential consumption patterns, we rely on evidence showing that out 
of pocket medical expenditures are relatively low in the Netherlands, and that poor 
health has on average a negative effect on non-medical expenditures (Bakx et al., 
2016; and van Ooijen et al., 2018). This evidence suggests that individuals who suffer 
20 Given the large number of observations we employ in the analysis, we lower the conventional 
thresholds for statistical significance by dividing them by ten.
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a non-sudden-death have lower non-medical expenditures during the last years of 
life, which would imply that the estimates in Table 4 are a lower bound.21
 As to differential incidence of income shocks, as mentioned in Section 2.1, Garcia-
Gomez et al. (2013) show that an unexpected hospital admission leads to a drop in 
yearly income of 5%. This effect would be larger without the generous disability 
benefit system in the Netherlands. However, it could still partially explain the results 
in Table 4. For that reason, we rerun the same estimations but excluding non-sudden 
deaths of individuals whose first cause-of-death-related hospital admission took 
place at age 65 or younger. For comparability purposes, we also exclude all deaths not 
preceded by any cause-of-death-related hospital admission that occurred at age 65 
or younger.
 Table 5 shows that, when we apply the above-mentioned restriction, the results 
do not change substantially. The most remarkable is that estimates for couples 
21 van Ooijen et al. (2018) show that the decrease in non-medical expenditures due to poor 
health is not offset with an increase in out-of-pocket medical expenditures. This result sug-
gests that the net effect of differential medical and/or non-medical consumption patterns 
would imply higher wealth at time of death for individuals who suffer a non-sudden death. 
This would counteract the effect we want to estimate, thus making our result a lower bound.
Table 5 Results: income shocks excluded 
Net worth Net financial wealth
(a)
Singles -9,087.48*** -6.20% -4,647.89*** -6.76%
(1,677.29) (1.14%) (1,252.62) (1.82%)
Couples -11,431.89* -4.50% -7,604.85 -7.47%
(4,445.03) (1.75%) (3,930.79) (3.86%)
(b)
Singles -10,158.91*** -6.88% -6,905.82*** -10.15%
(1,846.52) (1.25%) (1,425.67) (2.10%)
Couples -8,260.69 -3.19% -8,688.47 -8.42%
(4,730.20) (1.82%) (4,042.83) (3.92%)
Notes: Each cell provides an estimate of β1 in Equation (1). Percentage effects are presented next to 
each coefficient estimate. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
Panel (a) provides the effect of the non-sudden death dummy on wealth at the end of life, while 
Panel (b) provides the same effect conditional on non-sudden deaths having at least one previous 
hospital admission related to cause of death. In Panel (a), singles regressions include 503,165 
observations, while couples regressions include 317,843 observations. In Panel (b), singles 
regressions include 243,252 observations, while couples regressions include 164,729 observations. 
Given the large number of observations we employ in the analysis, we lower the conventional 
thresholds for statistical significance by dividing them by ten. *Significant at the 1% level, 
**significant at the 0.5% level, ***significant at the 0.1% level.
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become statistically insignificant. This is in line again with the idea that individuals 
who die within a marriage are likely to have a bequest motive towards the partner, 
suggesting that the effects for couples in Table 4 are mostly due to income loss due 
to poor health. The estimated effects for singles in Table 5 are still significant at the 
0.1% level even though the effects are slightly smaller compared to those in Table 4. 
Therefore, this analysis suggests that income loss due to poor health does have some 
effect on wealth at the end of life. However, this effect is not strong enough to explain 
the results for singles reported in Table 4.
5.3 Gender, age, and cause of death interactions
The effects reported in Tables 4 and 5 may be heterogeneous across different char-
acteristics, i.e. gender, age, and cause of death. Testing these heterogeneities can 
help attribute the effect we estimate to estate planning.22 Regarding gender, there is 
a large body of literature on differences in terms of financial literacy, and, arguably, 
a certain degree of literacy is necessary to engage in estate planning.23 When we 
interact NSi in Equation (1) with a gender dummy we do find statistically significant 
effects for both genders. However, the effects for men and women do not appear to 
be significantly different from each other.24
 Regarding heterogeneity of the effect across age groups, it appears that younger 
individuals do not engage in estate planning even when contracting an illness that 
is characterized by low survival rates. That is because younger individuals generally 
have a higher expectation of survival. At the same time, older individuals may start 
engaging in estate planning regardless of their health condition simply because they 
have already outlived the general life expectancy. For that reason we divide the sam-
ple into three age-of-death groups, i.e. young (age<70), middle aged (70≤age<85) 
and old (age≥85), and interact a dummy for each of these groups with NSi in Equation 
(1). The top panel in Table 6 shows that the effect for the younger group does not 
significantly differ from zero, while for the middle-aged and older groups the effects 
are statistically significant at the 0.1% significance level and not significantly different 
from each other. The effect for the younger group is only significantly different from 
22 Hereafter in the results section we focus on the results for singles provided in Panel (b) of Table 
4. The same extensions for the results for couples do not provide additional insights, so they 
are not reported here, but they are available upon request.
23 For a review of this literature and a seminal contribution to it, see Lusardi and Mitchell (2008).
24 The results of the gender interaction are not provided here, but they are available upon 
request.
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the effect for the older groups (at the 1% level of significance) when using net worth 
as a dependent variable.
 Regarding heterogeneity across causes of death, it might be that certain diseases 
are more likely than others to trigger estate planning type of behavior. The most 
likely to stimulate estate planning would be diseases that are well known to have 
low survival rates and that do not affect the cognitive abilities of the potential estate 
planner. Since we do not have information on prognoses, our approach here is to 
take the most common causes of death (i.e. those causing at least 5% of all deaths) 
and to generate a dummy variable for each of them. As Table B1 in Appendix B shows, 
the categories that each generate at least 5% of deaths are: neoplasms, i.e. cancers 
(31.57%), diseases of the circulatory system, i.e. cardiovascular diseases (29.18%), 
Table 6 Results: age and cause of death interaction (singles)
Net worth Net financial wealth
Age
Age<70 12,032.03 11.40% 772.48 1.96%
(5,539.12) (5.25%) (4,552.97) (11.60%)
70≤Age<85 -11,824.46*** -8.09% -7,885.22*** -12.81%
(2,645.28) (1.81%) (1,893.43) (3.08%)
Age≥85 -12,290.44*** -8.26% -8,389.79*** -11.21%
(2,593.88) (1.74%) (2,140.38) (2.86%)
Cause of death
Cancer -11,211.26*** -7.45% -14,621.90*** -24.38%
(2,705.91) (1.80%) (2,221.24) (3.70%)
Cardiovascular -9,879.29*** -7.22% -5,917.48*** -9.56%
(2,144.11) (1.57%) (1,738.42) (2.81%)
Respiratory -12,420.47*** -11.48% -1,365.10 -2.79%
(3,035.52) (2.81%) (2,236.58) (4.57%)
Mental 2,456.52 1.60% 6,597.09 7.88%
(8,672.35) (5.61%) (8,108.70) (9.69%)
Notes: Each cell provides an estimate of the main effect for each age and/or cause of death group. 
Percentage effects are presented next to each coefficient estimate. Estimates are obtained by 
interacting NSi in Equation (1) with age and with cause of death dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are provided in parentheses. All estimates are conditional on non-sudden deaths 
having at least one previous hospital admission related to cause of death. Regressions include 
243,252 observations. Given the large number of observations we employ in the analysis, we lower 
the conventional thresholds for statistical significance by dividing them by ten. *Significant at the 1% 
level, **significant at the 0.5% level, ***significant at the 0.1% level.
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diseases of the respiratory system (9.98%), and mental and behavioral disorders 
(5.73%).25
 The bottom panel in Table 6 shows strong significant effects for both cancer and 
cardiovascular diseases. However, when using net worth, the estimates do not signifi-
cantly differ across all cause-of-death categories at the 99% confidence level. When 
using net financial wealth as a dependent variable, we find a very strong and signif-
icant effect for deaths resulting from cancer and a less strong effect, but still highly 
significant, for deaths resulting from cardiovascular diseases. The effect for deaths 
resulting from cancer is significantly different from the effect for respiratory diseases, 
but not significantly different from the effect for mental disorders. That is because the 
latter effect is estimated with a large degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless, the results 
suggest relevant effects for deaths resulting from cancer and cardiovascular diseases, 
which is not the case for deaths resulting from respiratory diseases and mental disor-
ders. Given the reduced cognitive abilities of individuals with mental disorders, it is 
reasonable to assume that the effect can be equal or close to zero, reflecting absence 
of estate planning.
 If we break down deaths by type of cancer we see that the most common types 
of cancer are lung (23.57% of cancer deaths), colon (9.00%), breast (7.64%), prostate 
(5.85%), and pancreas (5.61%). Siegel et al. (2017) show, using data for the United 
States, that the five-year survival rates for these types of cancer range from 8% for 
pancreas to 99% for prostate, with lung (18%), colon (65%), and breast (90%) having 
values in between these two extremes.26 When interacting dummies for each one of 
these types of cancer with NSi in Equation (1), we find strong and highly significant 
effects (at the 0.1% level) for each type of cancer, ranging from -30% for pancreatic 
cancer to -23% for breast cancer. The point estimates are higher the lower is the sur-
vival rate for each type of cancer. However, the effects do not significantly differ from 
each other.27 Therefore, we cannot conclude that the estimated effect is stronger for 
certain types of cancer compared to others.
25 We generate a dummy for each of these causes of death and an additional dummy that takes 
value one if the cause of death is not one of the four mentioned here. The effect of these dum-
mies is estimated using sudden deaths as a reference group.
26 Note, however, that in our analysis we use a selection of cancer diagnoses that eventually all 
led to death. Therefore, we are almost certainly looking at a selection of diagnoses that had a 
below-average probability of survival.
27 The results for type-of-cancer interactions are not provided here, but they are available upon 
request.
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5.4 Quantile regression
As shown in Table 1, the dependent variable exhibits a high degree of skewness. It is 
thus relevant to examine whether the effect of interest differs across the distribution 
since individuals at the mean might not be very representative of individuals at the 
top. Kopczuk (2007) solved this issue by assuming that wealth follows a log-normal 
distribution and that, after applying the log transformation, the effect is the same at 
all percentiles of the distribution. In that scenario, the average effect is representative 
of the effect across the full distribution.28 However, Kopczuk (2007) could not test the 
log-normality assumption since he only observed individuals above the minimum 
estate tax threshold in the US, which effectively means that he only observed the 
very top of the wealth distribution. Since we observe the entire distribution, we can 
test whether absolute and relative effects differ across percentiles of the dependent 
variable. If relative effects at different points of the distribution are not significantly 
different from each other, it can be argued that the assumption of log-normality by 
Kopczuk (2007) is reasonable.
28 Angrist and Pischke (2009) show that using a symmetrically distributed dependent variable and 
homoskedastic errors, the estimated effects will be the same at any point of the distribution of 
the dependent variable.
Table 7 Results: quantile regression (singles)
Net worth Net financial wealth
p50 -3,273.69*** -15.14% -1,809.44*** -12.02%
(100.05) (0.46%) (71.74) (0.48%)
p75 -7,336.88*** -5.00% -4,627.36*** -11.10%
(543.82) (0.37%) (215.43) (0.52%)
p90 -16,806.22*** -4.39% -11,737.02*** -8.51%
(1,789.28) (0.47%) (911.11) (0.66%)
p95 -19,133.02*** -3.25% -14,987.92*** -5.96%
(3,347.17) (0.57%) (1,820.79) (0.72%)
p99 -35,774.88* -2.62% -27,796.87*** -3.76%
(13,159.45) (0.96%) (7,537.95) (1.02%)
Notes: Each cell provides an estimate of the main effect for each percentile. Percentage effects are 
presented next to each coefficient estimate. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are provided 
in parentheses. All estimates are conditional on non-sudden deaths having at least one previous 
hospital admission related to cause of death. Regressions include 243,252 observations. Given the 
large number of observations we employ in the analysis, we lower the conventional thresholds for 
statistical significance by dividing them by ten. *Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 
0.5% level, ***significant at the 0.1% level.
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 Table 7 shows that, for both net worth and net financial wealth, significant effects 
are estimated along the upper half of the distribution.29 In both cases, absolute 
effects increase as we move up the distribution, while relative effects decrease. 
Focusing on the relative effects, we find that, at the 99% level of confidence, the 
effects at the top of the distribution are differ significantly from those at the median 
and at the 75th percentile. This implies that effects estimated using OLS are not fully 
representative of what happens around the median, since they are slightly reduced 
by the smaller effects at the top of the distribution. Since Kopczuk (2007) reported 
only average relative effects, the results in Table 7 indicate that his results are not fully 
representative of the full distribution. This implies that he would most likely have 
estimated larger effects had he been able to run median regressions.
 It is not completely straightforward to reconcile the effects in Table 7 with the 
estate planning interpretation. If, given a bequest motive for saving, estate planning 
is triggered mostly by the motivation to avoid taxes, it makes sense that individuals at 
the top of the distribution show smaller relative effects, even when absolute effects 
are larger for them. That is because the Dutch estate tax schedule limits the amount 
of yearly tax exemptions for inter-vivos transfers, thus not allowing the very rich to 
avoid most of their tax obligation. Furthermore, it may be that individuals at the 
top of the distribution find other ways within the law to avoid paying taxes, so that 
transfers related to estate planning become relatively less important for them.
5.5 Children variables
A very interesting feature of our data is that it allows matching all individuals in our 
sample with information on their children. These data would allow conducting a 
study from the point of view of the children, to see what happens to their wealth 
when parents are terminally ill and engage in estate planning. This would also open 
the door to the possibility of distinguishing between different types of bequest 
motive, i.e. egoistic, altruistic, and strategic bequests.30 Although this is a very inter-
esting endeavor, it would require a different methodological set-up from that in our 
study. Therefore, we leave this approach for future work and focus here on introduc-
ing children variables in Equation (1) as control and interaction variables.
 When introducing children variables in our analysis (i.e. number of children 
outside of the household, average permanent income of children, and average age 
29 As shown in Table 1, individuals below the median have very little or no wealth. Therefore, 
results for that section of the distribution are not provided here.
30 See Suari-Andreu et al. (2019) for an explanation of the different types of bequest motive, as 
well as for a review of the literature on each of these.
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of children), the change in the coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5 is negligible. 
That is what we would expect since, even though the presence, income and age of 
children do have an effect on wealth at death, there is no reason to expect that these 
variables would correlate with the incidence of sudden deaths. In fact, Table 2 shows 
that the average number of children of individuals who suffer a sudden death and 
individuals who do not is virtually the same. When we interact NSi with the presence 
of children outside of the household, we find strong and highly significant effects for 
both individuals with and without children outside of the household. However, the 
effects for these two groups do not significantly differ from each other.31
 These results are in line with most relevant contributions in the literature on 
bequests (i.e. Hurd, 1989; Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007; and Lockwood, 2012). Both 
Hurd (1989) and Lockwood (2012) find very weak evidence of a bequest motive when 
estimating it based on the assumption that individuals without children do not have 
a bequest motive. In addition, both Lockwood (2012), using the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS) for the US, and Suari-Andreu et al. (2019), using the Dutch National Bank 
Household Survey, show that over 50% of individuals without children report that 
they find it at least somewhat important to leave a bequest.32 In line with these 
results, Hurd and Smith (2002) use the HRS exit interviews and find that the wealth of 
single individuals without children is mostly bequeathed to siblings (39%) and other 
relatives (45%), followed by friends (10%) and charity (6%).33
 In our dataset, 30.03% of single individuals and 16.49% of married individuals 
die without children. Following the above-mentioned literature, it is reasonable 
to assume that these individuals might also have a bequest motive (towards 
family members and/or non-family members) and thus engage in estate planning. 
Therefore, it is not possible to draw strong conclusions from this part of our analysis. 
Nevertheless, the availability of intergenerational data opens the possibility for future 
studies to analyze changes in children’s wealth in response to a shock that may 
trigger intergenerational transfers. The main hurdle is then to identify in the data the 
exact moment when these shocks that trigger intergenerational transfers occur.
31 The results for the presence-of-children interactions are not provided here, but they are avail-
able upon request.
32 Both studies find that individuals with children are more likely to report that they consider it 
important to save for a bequest. However, the share of individuals without children that consider 
it important to save for a bequest is certainly non-negligible as it is in both cases above 50%.
33 Hurd and Smith (2002) report as well that single individuals with children bequeath 92% of 
their wealth to their children. In addition, they report that married individuals bequeath 80% 
of their wealth to the surviving spouse. The latter result is in line with what we report in Table 
5, which shows no effect for individuals who die within a couple.
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6. Conclusion
In our study we provide evidence on estate planning and bequests. To do so, we 
use a comprehensive administrative dataset, including all deaths that occurred in 
the Netherlands between 2006 and 2013, and regress wealth at time of death on a 
dummy that indicates sudden deaths while controlling for gender, age, marital status, 
household structure, permanent income, and children characteristics. We find that 
individuals who do not suffer a sudden death die with less wealth compared to indi-
viduals who suffer a sudden death. The baseline effects are significant at the 0.5% 
level for singles and at the 0.1% level for couples. They range from -4.54% for the net 
worth of couples to -11.63% for the net financial wealth of singles. When controlling 
for the possibility of income shocks explaining our results, we find that the effect for 
couples becomes insignificant, while the effect for singles stays strong and significant. 
In addition, we find that the effect is somewhat stronger at older ages, and that it is 
especially strong when we focus on singles who die of cancer.
 Following Kopczuk (2007), we interpret these results as capturing estate planning 
in the expectation of an imminent death. As we explain in Section 2, the richness of 
our data, as well as several characteristics of the Dutch context described in Garcia-
Gomez et et al. (2013), Bakx et al. (2016), and van Ooijen et al. (2018), imply that 
our results are not likely explained by differential income shocks and or differential 
consumption patterns between individuals who suffer a sudden death and individu-
als who do not. In addition, our results are in line with van Ooijen et al. (2018) who, 
using Dutch survey data, find that health shocks at an advanced age lead to higher 
expenditures on gifts. The fact that we only find strong and significant effects for 
singles and when using net financial wealth as a dependent variable points in the 
direction that we are indeed capturing estate planning type of behavior.34 Therefore, 
the richness of our data and the context of our study represent a considerable advan-
tage compared to Kopczuk (2007) and provide additional credibility to his strategy for 
capturing estate planning.
 The strategy we pursue in this paper allows us to identify a bequest motive for 
saving insofar as this motive triggers the transfers that we observe. Compared to 
structural modeling, the main advantage of this strategy is that precautionary motives 
do not play a confounding factor, and thus no additional assumptions are needed to 
distinguish them from the bequest motive. However, the main shortcoming is that, 
34 That is because married individuals are likely to have a bequest motive towards their partner, 
which we do not capture since we observe wealth at the household level.
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even though we claim that estate planning reflects a bequest motive for saving, we 
cannot say with certainty what the initial main motive was for the accumulation of 
the wealth that ends up being transferred. It can be that individuals save initially for 
precautionary reasons with a bequest motive as a secondary priority, and that once 
they become terminally ill the bequest then becomes the main priority.
 Taking into account the above-mentioned caveat, we argue that our results imply 
that the bequest parameter as usually modelled in the life-cycle model (e.g. see De 
Nardi and Yang, 2014; and Lockwood, 2018) is positive. This implies that individuals 
derive utility from dying with positive wealth. If this argument holds, this positive 
bequest parameter will have non-negligible influence on individuals’ consumption 
and saving decisions throughout life. Nevertheless, it may also be that health shocks 
shift preferences towards using accumulated wealth as a bequest, and thus we 
observe inter-vivos transfers made in the anticipation of a near death. Even though 
we cannot fully distinguish between these two interpretations for our results, we 
argue that in both cases they reflect aspects of individuals’ preference towards their 
savings that are relevant for pension and long-term care policies.
 If pension wealth changes, the reaction of individuals in terms of their saving 
might be different depending on whether their priority is saving for future consump-
tion, for self-insurance, or for intergenerational transfers. Our results thus indicate 
that the literature on the displacement effect of pension wealth should take the 
bequest motive into account. In addition, our results, combined with those by van 
Ooijen et al. (2018), suggest that the priorities of older individuals lean more towards 
intergenerational transfers rather than towards own consumption.35 This priority 
might be intensified for individuals who suffer a terminal illness.36 Information on 
the spending priorities of older individuals is a crucial input for determining pension 
adequacy to the consumption needs of retirees.
 As to long-term care policies, our result suggests that, should publicly provided 
long-term care becomes less generous, this might generate a conflict between an 
individual’s preference to leave a bequest and the necessity of covering out-of-
pocket medical expenditures. Therefore, in line with the argumentation by Lockwood 
(2012, 2018), in such a scenario the welfare of individuals would improve if they can 
35 As explained in Section 2, van Ooijen et al. (2018) find that the onset of a chronic illness 
reduces consumption by close to 7%. In addition, they find that health shocks increase 
 expenditures on gifts.
36 A terminal illness is a condition in which setting money aside for future health shocks becomes 
less important due to poor health condition and reduced life expectancy. Therefore, in such a 
situation the trade-off may be only between using wealth either for own expenditure or for 
gifts and/or bequests.
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purchase actuarially fair long-term care insurance products that allow them to set 
part of their wealth aside for a potential bequest. In that sense, financial products 
that combine annuities with long-term care insurance might become important in 
allowing individuals to best adapt their wealth to their personal preferences. That 
is because such products provide insurance against both longevity risk and medical 
risk, while ideally leaving enough leeway to set aside the amount of wealth that one 
wishes to bequeath.37
 Even though our study contributes to the line of research initiated by Kopczuk 
(2007) and complements the literature that focuses on identifying bequests using 
structural models (i.e. Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007; and Lockwood, 2012, 2018), there 
are still several venues for improvement through future research. For instance, linking 
administrative and survey data would allow for a better distinction between the 
estate planning interpretation of the results, and the other interpretation referring 
to differential consumption patterns and income loss. In addition, variation in estate 
tax rates can be used in the future to identify whether and to what extent, given 
a bequest motive, estate planning is triggered by the aim of avoiding estate taxes. 
This strategy may help to better capture not only the presence of a bequest motive, 
but also its intensity. That could be done by investigating to what extent individuals 
exploit the possibilities for exemption that tax regulations provide. Finally, shifting 
the focus from parents to children might allow identifying how children’s wealth 
is affected by shocks to their parent’s health, and to possibly distinguish between 
different types of bequest motive.
37 The possibility of combining annuities with long-term care insurance products has been widely 
studied, see e.g. Davidoff (2009). He argues that it might be optimal to combine these two 
products to counteract the adverse selection problems individuals are often confronted with. 
Allowing access to long-term care insurance in such way may help individuals to satisfy their 
preference to leave a bequest, which they would otherwise have to spend on medical care in 
case of poor health.
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Appendices
A. Variable definitions and summary statistics
Table A1 Variable definitions 
Variable Definition
Net worth Total assets minus total liabilities at the household level. Measured as 
of December 31 of the year prior to death.
Net financial wealth Sum of deposits, savings accounts, stocks and bonds, minus non-
mortgage debt at the household level. Measured as of December 31 of 
the year prior to death.
Sudden death Dummy variable indicating unexpected deaths that occur 
instantaneously or within a few hours of an abrupt change in a 
person’s clinical state. Operationalized using the ICD-10 categories for 
myocardial infarction, cardiac arrest, congestive heart failure, stroke, 
sudden death from unknown causes, transport accidents, and death 
caused by other accidents and violence. Individuals with one or more 
hospital admissions due to cardiovascular disease are excluded from 
the sudden death category if their death resulted from one of the 
cardiovascular causes mentioned here.
Marital status Marital status of single decedents. 1: Never married;  
2: Divorced or separated; 3: Widowed.
Household structure Demographic structure of the household. 1: One-person household;  
2: Single parent; 3: Couple without children; 4: Couple with children; 
5: Multiperson household; 6: Institutionalized household.
Age 1: age<70; 2: 70≤age<85; 3: age≥85.
Permanent income If the main source of income in the year prior to death is not pension 
income: average of yearly equivalized household income between 
2003 and the year prior to death. If the main source of income the 
the year prior to death is pension income: equivalized household 
income in the year prior to death. Income is equivalized by diving it 
by the square root of the number of members in the household.
Delay Measure in days of the delay between wealth measurement and time 
of death. Wealth measurement corresponds to December 31 of the 
year prior to death.
Children outside Presence of children outside the household. 
Avg. age of children Average age of the children of the decedent.
Avg. permanent income 
of children
Average permanent income of the children of the decedent. 
Permanent income is computed using the same method as for 
the permanent income of the decedent.
Notes: ICD-10 stands for the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems assembled by the World Health Organization.
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Table A2 Summary statistics - singles 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Net worth 139,193.80 22,073 487,880.70 -2.06e+07 6.69e+07
Net financial wealth 64,047.77 15,759 361,415.90 -2.06e+07 6.59e+07
Sudden death 0.16 - - - -
Female 0.52 - - - -
Marital status
– Never married 0.48 - - - -
– Divorced or separated 0.15 - - - -
– Widowed 0.35 - - - -
Household structure
– One person household 0.58 - - - -
– Single parent 0.05 - - - -
– Multiperson household 0.06 - - - -
– Institutionalized 
   household 
0.31 - - - -
Age
<70 0.13 - - - -
70-85 0.24 - - - -
>85 0.63 - - - -
Permanent income 18,364.87 16,100 9,573.88 -353,553.40 670,258.80
Retired 0.81 - - - -
Delay 177.63 174 107.72 0 365
Presence of children outside 0.71 - - - -
Avg. age of children 52.10 53.50 10.18 0 89
Avg. permanent income 
of children 
23,802.62 22,074.25 10,669.25 -139,308.30 766,374.40
Note: All summary statistics are based on the number of observations in the singles regressions of 
Panel (a) in Table 4, i.e. 588,818.
giving with a warm hand 35
Table A3 Summary statistics - couples 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max.
Net worth 247,456.60 100,122 847,030.50 -1.42e+07 2.58e+08
Net financial wealth 94,809.91 24,821 701,322.9 -6.96e+07 2.53e+08
Sudden death 0.11 - - - -
Female 0.33 - - - -
Household structure
– Couple without kids 0.79 - - - -
– Couple with kids 0.09 - - - -
– Multiperson household 0.03 - - - -
– Institutionalized 
   household
0.07 - - - -
Age
<70 0.35 - - - -
70-85 0.50 - - - -
>85 0.15 - - - -
Permanent income 20,523.30 17,937.18 11,046.35 -353,553.40 707,106.80
Retired 0.74 - - - -
Delay 181.09 179 107.31 0 365
Presence of children outside 0.84 - - - -
Avg. age of children 44.23 45 9.21 0 86
Avg. permanent income 
of children
23,109.44 21,593.64 9,744.10 -183,785.50 506,818
Note: All summary statistics are based on the number of observations in the couples regressions of 
Panel (a) in Table 4, i.e. 433,202.
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B. Cause of death classification
Table B1 Cause of death categories ICD-10 
Category Frequency Percentage
Infectious diseases 17,133 1.60%
Neoplasms 338,811 31.57%
Blood diseases 3,608 0.34%
Endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases 30,453 2.84%
Mental and behavioural disorders 61,544 5.73%
Diseases of the nervous system 37,382 3.48%
Diseases of the ear and mastoid process 123 0.01%
Diseases of the circulatory system 313,222 29.18%
Diseases of the respiratory system 107,154 9.98%
Diseases of the digestive system 41,170 3.84%
Diseases of the skin 2,888 0.27%
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system 6,909 0.64%
Diseases of the genito-urinary system 26,194 2.44%
Pregnancy, childbirth, and puerperium 57 0.01%
Conditions originating in the perinatal period 3 0.00%
Congenital malformations 1,703 0.16%
Ill-defined conditions 41,942 3.91%
External causes of morbidity and mortality 42,986 4.01%
Total 1,073,282 100%
Notes: Causes of death are classified according to the ICD-10. For further information, see WHO 
(2016).
Table B2 Sudden death categories ICD-10 
Category Frequency Percentage
Acute myocardial infarction 34,578 24.41%
Cardiac arrest 13,520 9.54%
Congestive heart failure 23,533 16.61%
Stroke 38,729 27.34%
Transport accidents 4,670 3.30%
Other accidents and violence 23,468 16.57%
Sudden deaths from unknown causes 3,157 2.23%
Total 141,655 100%
Note: Causes of death are classified according to the ICD-10. For further information, see WHO 
(2016).
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C. Full regression results
Table C1 Full results: baseline 





































































































R2 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.12
Observations 588,818 433,202 588,818 433,202
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. All coefficients are 
given in thousands of euros except for permanent income and delay. The category one-person 
household is used as a reference category for the household structure of single households, while 
the category couple without kids is used for married households. All regressions include dummy 
variables indicating year of death. Given the large number of observations we employ in the 
analysis, we lower the conventional thresholds for statistical significance by dividing them by ten. 
*Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 0.5% level, ***significant at the 0.1% level.
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